The Crisis of Meaning in the Global Financial Order
Antonio Gramsci, imprisoned by Mussolini’s fascist regime in 1930, scribbled a phrase in his notebook that would become one of the most quoted passages in political theory: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”.
Gramsci was writing about the collapse of the liberal order in interwar Europe, the rise of fascism, and the failure of anti-capitalist forces to articulate a coherent alternative. But his words describe with uncanny precision the condition of the contemporary global financial order—and, more specifically, the condition of Switzerland as it navigates the collapse of American financial hegemony.
The old order—the American-centered financial system that has governed global capital flows since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944—is dying. The signs of its demise are everywhere: the $40 trillion American debt, the decline of the dollar’s share of global reserves to a three-decade low, the proliferation of alternative payment systems, the military defeats in the Middle East and Europe, the collapse of the narrative of American benevolence and competence.
The old order is dying, but it is not yet dead.
The new order—a multipolar financial system centered on Eurasian integration, local currency settlement, and the BRICS Pay infrastructure—is struggling to be born. The infrastructure exists, the transactions are processing, the alternatives are operational. But the new order is not yet fully formed, not yet institutionalized, not yet accepted as the natural framework for global finance.
And in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. The compliance cost crisis that burdens Swiss banks with billions of francs in annual expenditures for infrastructure designed to satisfy a declining hegemon. The identity crisis of a nation that has defined itself by neutrality now questioned by the transactional logic of great-power politics. The crisis of meaning in which the narratives that once explained Switzerland’s place in the world—as a neutral intermediary, as a discreet haven, as a sovereign actor—no longer correspond to the reality of a financial system that has been subordinated to American demands.
This chapter argues that the Swiss-American financial relationship is in a state of interregnum—a period of transition between an old order that is dying and a new order that cannot yet be born. The Swiss ideology of neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion is fundamentally incompatible with the American ideology of exceptionalism, mission, and domination. This incompatibility is not merely a matter of policy differences; it is a matter of philosophical foundations, of competing conceptions of what money is for, of what sovereignty means, of what it means to be a nation in the world. The dialectic between these two ideologies cannot sustain itself. The compliance costs that Swiss banks bear are the material expression of this incompatibility. The crisis of meaning that afflicts Swiss society is the subjective experience of this dialectic. And the interregnum—the period of morbid symptoms—will end only when Switzerland chooses to abandon the American order and embrace the multipolar future that is emerging.
The Philosophy of Transition
Gramsci’s concept of the interregnum is not merely a description of a historical moment; it is a philosophical framework for understanding periods of transition between hegemonic orders. Gramsci understood that hegemony—the dominance of one class or nation over others—is not maintained by force alone. It is maintained through consent, through the construction of a common sense that makes the existing order appear natural, inevitable, and even desirable. When that common sense erodes, when the consent that sustained the hegemonic order dissolves, the interregnum begins.
The interregnum is not a pleasant period. It is characterized by what Gramsci called “morbid symptoms”—pathologies that emerge when the old order is dying, but the new order has not yet been born. In the interregnum, the old certainties are gone, but the new certainties have not yet emerged. The institutions that once provided stability are no longer trusted. The narratives that once explained the world are no longer believed. The values that once guided behavior are no longer shared. The result is a crisis of meaning—a condition in which individuals and societies can no longer understand their place in the world.
Gramsci’s analysis was rooted in his observation of interwar Europe, but its applicability to the contemporary global financial order is striking. The American hegemony that has governed global finance since 1944 is a hegemonic order in Gramsci’s sense. It was maintained not merely by the coercive power of the dollar clearing system but by the consent of the nations that participated in that system. That consent was constructed through the narrative of American benevolence—the belief that American leadership served the interests of all, that the dollar system provided stability and prosperity, that compliance with American demands was the price of participation in a beneficial order.
That narrative has collapsed.
The consent that sustained American hegemony has dissolved. The nations of the world no longer believe that American leadership serves their interests. They no longer trust the dollar system to provide stability. They no longer accept compliance with American demands as the price of participation in a beneficial order. The interregnum has begun.
The Old Order: American Hegemony and Its Contradictions
The American financial order that emerged from World War II was built on a trinity of foundations: military supremacy, dollar dominance, and the consent of the governed. Military supremacy ensured that the security architecture within which the dollar operated remained stable. Dollar dominance ensured that the American financial system was the center of global finance. The consent ensured that other nations accepted this arrangement as legitimate.
The ideological foundation of American hegemony was what I have called in previous chapters the Wolfowitz Doctrine—the declaration that the United States would prevent the emergence of any independent power, that it would maintain military supremacy sufficient to deter any challenger, and that it would shape the international order according to American interests. This doctrine was not merely a policy; it was an expression of American identity—a secularized version of the Calvinist belief in election, predestination, and divine mission.
The Calvinist foundations of American ideology are not a historical curiosity; they are a living force that shapes American behavior in the present. The Puritans who settled New England believed they were the chosen people, the new Israel, the city upon a hill that would serve as a beacon to the world. This self-understanding has persisted through centuries of American history, shaping the American approach to the world in ways that remain profoundly consequential.
The Calvinist doctrine of predestination—the belief that some are elected for salvation and others for damnation—has shaped American thinking about international relations in ways that are not immediately obvious but are profoundly consequential.
The doctrine implies a division of humanity into the saved and the damned, the chosen and the rejected, the elect and the reprobate. This division has been secularized into a political framework: the Americans are the elect, the chosen people. The rest of the world is the reprobate, the unchosen. The elect have no obligation to compromise with the reprobate. The elect have an obligation to transform the reprobate, to subordinate them to the will of the elect.
This ideological framework made genuine negotiation with the United States impossible. The American approach to international relations was not one of mutual accommodation but of unilateral imposition. The United States did not seek compromise; it sought compliance. It did not offer reciprocity; it demanded submission. The Wolfowitz Doctrine was the logical expression of this ideological framework—a declaration that any nation pursuing an independent foreign policy was a threat to American hegemony and must be subordinated.
The Swiss Order: Neutrality, Sovereignty, and the Ethic of Discretion
The Swiss ideological framework is fundamentally different from the American framework. Switzerland’s national identity is rooted not in election and mission but in neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion. The Swiss have never seen themselves as the chosen people; they have seen themselves as a small nation navigating the conflicts of larger powers through a combination of armed neutrality, diplomatic skill, and financial acumen.
The Swiss conception of neutrality is not merely a policy; it is a philosophical stance—a way of being in the world. The Swiss historian Laurent Goetschel has observed that “neutrality is not an ideology or a belief. It is a principle of state security”. This is a crucial distinction. For the Swiss, neutrality is not a moral commitment to pacifism or a rejection of force; it is a strategic choice—the choice to remain outside the conflicts of other nations in order to preserve independence and prosperity.
The Swiss conception of sovereignty is similarly different from the American conception. The Swiss have never sought to impose their will on other nations. They have sought to protect their own independence, to maintain their own laws, to preserve their own way of life. The Swiss model of democracy—participatory, federalist, decentralized—reflects this conception of sovereignty.
As the historian Louis Hartz observed, Switzerland “possesses a unique form of democratic government the hallmarks of which are participatory democracy, neutrality and radical federalism”. These hallmarks give Swiss democracy a character that “stands in stark contrast to traditional Anglo-American democracy”.
The Swiss conception of discretion is perhaps the most distinctive element of the Swiss ideological framework. The Swiss tradition of banking secrecy—the guarantee that client information would never be disclosed to foreign authorities—was not merely a commercial practice; it was an expression of a philosophical commitment to privacy, to the protection of individual wealth from the predations of states, to the principle that the relationship between a banker and a client is sacred. This tradition drew on the Genevan heritage of Calvinism, but it transformed that heritage into something distinctively Swiss: a secular ethic of discretion that served clients of all faiths and all nations.
The Swiss ideological framework is fundamentally incompatible with the American framework. The Swiss believe in neutrality; the Americans believe in mission. The Swiss believe in sovereignty; the Americans believe in hegemony. The Swiss believe in discretion; the Americans believe in transparency. The Swiss believe in serving all masters; the Americans believe in serving no master but themselves. The dialectic between these two ideologies is a dialectic of opposites—a confrontation between two ways of being in the world that cannot be reconciled.
The Dialectic of Incompatibility: When Opposites Cannot Meet
The Swiss-American financial relationship has always been characterized by this fundamental incompatibility, but the incompatibility was suppressed for decades by the overwhelming power of the United States. During the Cold War, Switzerland’s neutrality served American interests, and the United States tolerated Swiss banking secrecy because it served American purposes.
After the Cold War, when the United States became the unchallenged hegemon, the tolerance ended. The American campaign against Swiss banking secrecy—the UBS case, the Credit Suisse prosecution, the FATCA regime—was an attempt to eliminate the Swiss ideological framework and replace it with the American one.
The attempt was partially successful. Swiss banking secrecy was dismantled. Swiss banks were compelled to report American account holders to the IRS. Swiss law was subordinated to American jurisdiction. But the attempt was never complete. The Swiss ideological framework—the commitment to neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion—was suppressed but not eliminated. It persisted beneath the surface, waiting for the conditions that would allow it to re-emerge.
The interregnum is the period in which this suppressed framework is re-emerging. The American hegemony that suppressed the Swiss framework is eroding. The military supremacy that underpinned American power is being challenged. The dollar dominance that enabled American coercion is declining. The consent that sustained American hegemony has dissolved. The Swiss framework—the commitment to neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion—is re-emerging as the natural framework for a multipolar world.
The dialectic of incompatibility is now unfolding in real time. The American ideology of exceptionalism, mission, and domination cannot coexist with the Swiss ideology of neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion. The two frameworks are in diametric opposition. The dialectic cannot sustain itself. One must give way to the other. And the evidence suggests that it is the American framework that is giving way.
The compliance cost crisis that burdens Swiss banks with billions of francs in annual expenditures is the material expression of the interregnum. The compliance infrastructure that Swiss banks have built—the AML departments, the KYC systems, the FATCA reporting obligations—was designed to satisfy American demands. It was built to mitigate the risk of exclusion from the dollar-denominated financial system. It was the price of survival in an American-dominated order.
The compliance cost crisis is the material expression of the interregnum because it reflects the contradiction between the old order and the new. The old order—the American-dominated financial system—requires compliance infrastructure that satisfies American demands. The new order—the multipolar financial system—does not. The compliance infrastructure that Swiss banks have built is a burden that the old order imposes but that the new order does not require. As the new order emerges, the burden will be shed.
The Crisis of Meaning: The Subjective Experience of the Interregnum
The crisis of meaning that afflicts Swiss society is the subjective experience of the interregnum. It is the condition in which the narratives that once explained Switzerland’s place in the world—as a neutral intermediary, as a discreet haven, as a sovereign actor—no longer correspond to the reality of a financial system that has been subordinated to American demands.
The Swiss identity has been shaped by the experience of neutrality—the policy of remaining outside the conflicts of other nations, of serving as a neutral ground for diplomacy and finance, of protecting the wealth of clients from all nations. This identity was not merely a matter of policy; it was a matter of being. To be Swiss was to be neutral, to be discreet, to be sovereign. The Swiss national identity was inseparable from the Swiss financial identity—the tradition of banking secrecy, the commitment to discretion, the service of clients regardless of their nationality or their politics.
The American campaign against Swiss banking secrecy was not merely an attack on Swiss financial practices; it was an attack on Swiss identity. The demand for transparency was a demand that Switzerland abandon its tradition of discretion. The demand for information was a demand that Switzerland abandon its commitment to protecting client privacy. The demand for compliance was a demand that Switzerland abandon its sovereignty.
The Swiss response to this attack was ambivalent. Some Swiss resisted—the Swiss People’s Party, the defenders of banking secrecy, the advocates of neutrality. Others accommodated—the political establishment, the financial elite, the beneficiaries of the American-dominated order. The result was a compromise that satisfied no one: banking secrecy was dismantled, but the Swiss commitment to neutrality and sovereignty was preserved in rhetoric even as it was abandoned in practice.
The crisis of meaning is the result of this compromise. The neutrality that defined the national identity has been compromised by alignment with American interests. The sovereignty that defined the national existence has been subordinated to American jurisdiction. The discretion that defined the national financial practice has been eliminated by American demands.
This crisis of meaning is evident in the public discourse. The Swiss debate about neutrality—whether to maintain the traditional policy or to align more closely with the West—is a debate about identity. The Swiss debate about banking secrecy—whether to defend the tradition or to accept the American demands—is a debate about values. The Swiss debate about the American relationship—whether to comply or to resist—is a debate about sovereignty. The Swiss are searching for a new narrative, a new story that will explain their place in the post-American world.
The New Order: The Birth Pangs of a Multipolar Financial System
The new order that is struggling to be born is a multipolar financial system centered on Eurasian integration, local currency settlement, and the BRICS Pay infrastructure. The infrastructure of this new order already exists.
The new order is not merely a technical infrastructure; it is an ideological alternative to the American-dominated order. The new order is based on the principles of sovereignty, reciprocity, and mutual respect—the principles that the Swiss have always championed.
The new order does not demand that nations abandon their sovereignty. It does not demand that they subordinate their interests to the interests of a hegemon. It does not demand that they accept the surveillance and control that the American order imposes.
The new order is the natural home for Switzerland. The Swiss ideological framework—the commitment to neutrality, sovereignty, and discretion—is fundamentally compatible with the multipolar order. The Swiss tradition of serving all masters, of maintaining discretion, of protecting the wealth of clients from all nations—these are the virtues that the multipolar order requires. The Swiss financial system, freed from the burden of American compliance, can return to its traditional function—the absorption of capital, the protection of privacy, the service of those who hold sway.
The birth pangs of the new order are evident in the growing resistance to American financial hegemony. The European Union’s Blocking Statute, designed to protect European economic operators from the extraterritorial application of third-country laws, has been invoked in response to American sanctions on Cuba, Iran, and the International Criminal Court. Spain has called for the activation of the Blocking Statute to protect ICC judges and prosecutors from American sanctions. The resistance is growing, and it is finding institutional expression.
The Role of Switzerland in the New Order
Switzerland is positioned to play a central role in the new order. The nation’s tradition of neutrality, its multilingual workforce, its sophisticated financial infrastructure, and its reputation for stability and discretion make it the natural hub for the multipolar financial order. The Swiss National Bank’s gold holdings—approximately 1,040 tonnes, with 70 percent stored on Swiss soil—provide the foundation for this safe-haven function. The Swiss franc’s performance—gaining nearly 13 percent against the dollar in 2025—confirms the market’s assessment of Swiss stability.
The Swiss financial system is already experiencing the inflows that this logic predicts. The Swiss Banking Outlook 2026 reports that a majority of experts expect growth in cross-border wealth management, “supported by geopolitically motivated capital inflows and Switzerland’s enduring appeal as a safe and stable place to store wealth.” Wealthy individuals from the Gulf states are showing increasing interest in Switzerland, particularly during periods of global uncertainty. Experts estimate that “several dozen billion” dollars could flow from the region into Switzerland depending on further geopolitical developments.
The Swiss role in the new order is not merely passive; it is active. The Swiss can serve as the neutral ground where the powers of the multipolar order meet—the place where Chinese, Russian, Indian, and Gulf capital can be intermediated without the surveillance and control that the American order imposes. The Swiss can provide the technological foundation for the new financial infrastructure—the blockchain platforms, the digital currency systems, the clearing mechanisms that operate outside the American perimeter. The Swiss can serve as the bridge between the European and Asian economic spheres—the peninsula of Asia that is Europe and the Eurasian landmass that is the new center of global economic gravity.
The Interregnum and the Choice
The interregnum is a period of transition, not a permanent condition. The old order is dying; the new order is struggling to be born. The morbid symptoms that characterize the interregnum—the compliance cost crisis, the identity crisis, the crisis of meaning—will persist until the new order is born. The question is not whether the new order will emerge; it will. The question is what role Switzerland will play in it.
The choice before Switzerland is clear. The nation can continue to cling to the dying American order—continuing to bear the compliance costs, continuing to accept the surveillance and control, continuing to subordinate its sovereignty to American demands. Or it can embrace the new order—shedding the compliance burden, reclaiming its sovereignty, returning to its traditional function of capital absorption, privacy protection, and service to global wealth.
The choice is not merely a matter of policy; it is a matter of identity. The Swiss have always defined themselves by their neutrality, their sovereignty, their discretion. The American order has suppressed these virtues. The new order will restore them. The Swiss can be Swiss again—not the subordinate instrument of a declining hegemon, but the sovereign, neutral, and indispensable hub of the multipolar financial order that is emerging.
Gramsci understood that the interregnum is a period of danger and opportunity. The danger is that the morbid symptoms will persist, that the old order will linger, that the new order will never be born. The opportunity is that the interregnum is a period of choice—a period in which the future is not yet determined, in which the old certainties have dissolved but the new certainties have not yet been established. The Swiss have the opportunity to shape the new order, to define their role in it, to reclaim their identity.
The old order is dying. The new order is struggling to be born. The interregnum is the period of morbid symptoms. But the interregnum is also the period of possibility—the period in which Switzerland can choose to be Swiss again.
Endnotes
1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971), Notebook 3 (1930): “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Gramsci recorded this passage during his incarceration in the Turi prison. See Gilbert Achcar, “Morbid Symptoms: What Did Gramsci Really Mean?” Journal for Studies on Power (Brill, 2022). (See “The Philosophy of Transition”)
2. The Wolfowitz Doctrine refers to the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance drafted by Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby. The document declared: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival… we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” The document was leaked to The New York Times and The Washington Post in March 1992. See PBS Frontline, “Excerpts From 1992 Draft ‘Defense Planning Guidance’.” (See “The Old Order: American Hegemony and Its Contradictions”)
3. John Winthrop delivered “A Model of Christian Charity” in 1630 aboard the Arbella: “For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” The phrase derives from the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:14). See Daniel T. Rodgers, As a City on a Hill: The Story of America’s Most Famous Lay Sermon (Princeton University Press, 2018); Ian Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism: A New History of an Old Idea (University of Chicago Press, 2021). (See “The Old Order: American Hegemony and Its Contradictions”)
4. Laurent Goetschel, Professor of Political Science at the University of Basel and Director of Swisspeace: “La neutralité n’est pas une idéologie ou une croyance. C’est un principe de sécurité de l’Etat.” See Bluewin/Keystone-ATS, “Le 11-Septembre a accéléré la mutation de la neutralité suisse,” September 10, 2026. (See “The Swiss Order: Neutrality, Sovereignty, and the Ethic of Discretion”)
5. Louis Hartz observed that Switzerland “possesses a unique form of democratic government the hallmarks of which are participatory democracy, neutrality and radical federalism,” giving Swiss democracy a character that “stands in stark contrast to traditional Anglo-American democracy.” See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). (See “The Swiss Order: Neutrality, Sovereignty, and the Ethic of Discretion”)
6. Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Banking Act (1934) criminalized the disclosure of client information by bank employees, officers, or agents, imposing a custodial sentence of up to three years or a fine. The stated goal of the 1934 legislation was to prevent client data from being accessed by other states. See Swiss Banking Act, Article 47; VISCHER, “Swiss banking secrecy: Myth or reality?” June 9, 2015. (See “The Swiss Order: Neutrality, Sovereignty, and the Ethic of Discretion”)
7. PwC, “Swiss AML Survey 2026” (May 2026). The survey found that 74% of Swiss respondents expect AML compliance costs to rise over the next 24 months, with 43% bracing for increases of 10–30%. The survey also found that 80% of Swiss institutions consider current AML rules to be insufficiently effective or practical—only 17% rate them as “fully effective.” See PwC Switzerland, “Swiss AML Survey 2026.” (See “The Dialectic of Incompatibility”)
8. The compliance cost burden across the Swiss financial system is estimated at CHF 5–8 billion annually, with over 240 banks, hundreds of asset managers, and other regulated entities. AML monitoring systems generate false positive rates of 95–99 percent. See Zuerich.ai, “AI Compliance & RegTech in Swiss Finance” (February 2026); Virtue Compliance, “AML-Compliance Kosten: Was sie wirklich kostet” (February 2026). (See “The Dialectic of Incompatibility”)
9. The Swiss National Bank holds 1,040 tonnes of gold, with 70 percent stored on Swiss soil and 30 percent abroad. The SNB has stated it has no plans to increase or decrease its gold holdings. See GoldSilver, “What Switzerland’s Gold Freeze Means for Investors” (April 28, 2026); Swiss National Bank, Interim Results (April 2026). (See “The Role of Switzerland in the New Order”)
10. The Swiss franc gained nearly 13 percent against the dollar in 2025, reaching its strongest level since January 2015. Morgan Stanley described the franc as “arguably the most ‘gold-like’ safe haven currency.” See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Der Franken ist in der Krise begehrt,” January 8, 2026. (See “The Role of Switzerland in the New Order”)
11. Swiss Banking Outlook 2026 reports that a majority of experts expect growth in cross-border wealth management, “supported by geopolitically motivated capital inflows and Switzerland’s enduring appeal as a safe and stable place to store wealth.” See Swiss Bankers Association, “Swiss Banking Outlook 2026: Wealth Management.” (See “The Role of Switzerland in the New Order”)
12. Reuters reported that Swiss money managers expect the Iran war to increase inflows from the Gulf, with estimates of “several dozen billion” dollars potentially flowing into Switzerland. Cash positions held in Switzerland by private and non-bank entities from the UAE have increased by approximately 40 percent over the past three years. See Reuters, “Swiss money managers expect Iran war to increase inflows from Gulf,” March 13, 2026; Swissinfo, “Switzerland’s Zug becomes bolt-hole for Gulf-based wealth,” April 12, 2026. (See “The Role of Switzerland in the New Order”)
13. The BRICS Pay platform was launched in September 2025 following the Kazan summit. The system is based on a decentralized cross-border messaging model (DCMS) developed by St. Petersburg University. It integrates Russia’s SBP system (used by over 200 institutions), Brazil’s Pix, India’s UPI, and China’s CIPS into a unified cross-border mechanism. See BPMoney, “Brics Pay estreia em setembro: ameaça ao dólar dos EUA?” September 15, 2025; Revista Fórum, “Brics lança sistema de pagamentos inspirado no Pix,” August 15, 2025. (See “The New Order: The Birth Pangs of a Multipolar Financial System”)
14. The European Union’s Blocking Statute (Council Regulation No 2271/96) was adopted in November 1996 to protect EU operators from the extraterritorial effects of U.S. sanctions. It renders foreign sanctions legally null within the EU and prohibits EU entities from complying with them. Spain has called for its activation to protect ICC judges and prosecutors from American sanctions. See European Parliament, “Answer to Question No E-2412/07,” July 23, 2007. (See “The New Order: The Birth Pangs of a Multipolar Financial System”)